St. Joseph Church
Bristol, Connecticut

Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Pastoral Minister

With the recent nuclear weapons tests of India and Pakistan the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has emerged as a top international issue. The meaning of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan for the Southeast region of Asia is unclear. Yet future plans for new ballistic missile development and deployment by both nations portends ominous possibilities for the future of regional and international security. Such developments may move the international community to accelerate efforts for nuclear disarmament, or lead to an international legitimacy to possessing nuclear weapons leading to a universalizing of the possession of these weapons.

The following chart offers a picture of the proliferation problem as of July 1998.

Recognized Nuclear Weapon States

China: 275 operational strategic warheads and 150 operational tactical warheads;

France: 400 operational strategic warheads, 60 operational tactical warheads and 50 warheads awaiting dismantlement;

India: possesses 60 to 80 weapons (recently declared nuclear power, May 1998);

Pakistan: possess 10 to 15 weapons (recently declared nuclear power May 1998);

Russia: 6,240 operational strategic warheads, 4000 tactical operational warheads, about 18,000 warheads in reserve or awaiting dismantlement;

United Kingdom: 200 operational strategic warheads, 80 operational tactical warheads (to be retired), and 120 warheads awaiting dismantlement;

United States: 7,450 operational strategic warheads, 970 operational tactical warheads, 2,300 warheads in reserve, 1,350 awaiting dismantlement.

India, Israel and Pakistan: These three states are not members of the NPT, but are believed to possess nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons ( India and Pakistan are now declared nuclear powers as of may 1998) that can be quickly assembled. India first tested a peaceful nuclear explosive device in May 1974, and claimed its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only. In May 1998, after both states announced having completed five nuclear tests, India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear powers. Estimates of the current arsenals of the de facto nuclear powers are: India, 60 to 80 weapons; Israel, 70 to 125 weapons; Pakistan 10 to 15 weapons. India and Israel are assumed to use plutonium (Pu239) in their weapons; Pakistan is believed to use enriched Uranium (U235).

North Korea: Pyongyang's nuclear program has been frozen under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards since 1994, when it signed the Agreed framework with the United States. The deal calls for North Korea to freeze and then give up all the components of its nuclear weapons program. In exchange, the Clinton administration agreed to arrange for the provision of two 1,000 megawatt (electric) light-water reactors, and annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil until the first reactor is complete. Before the nuclear components of the light-water reactors can actually be delivers, Pyongyang will have to account for about 7 kilograms of plutonium the United States and the IAEA believes were produced prior to 1994.

Iran: Tehran is a member in good standing of the NPT. The United States, however, believes it is secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program and has been trying to end international nuclear commerce with Iran. In 1995, Moscow signed a $1 billion contract to complete the 1,000 megawatt (electric) nuclear reactor project at Bushehr that was begun by the German company Siemens in May 1976 and stopped because of the Islamic revolution in 1979. At Washington's urging, Russia agreed in May 1995 not to sell Iran uranium enrichment technology. In March 1998, Moscow and Tehran reached an agreement in principle to allow Russia to build up to three more civil reactors in Iran.

In order to implement its 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington, in October 1997 Beijing pledged to end all civil nuclear cooperation with Iran after completing two facilities of little proliferation concern: a factory for making zirconium cladding for nuclear reactor fuel and a small zero-power research reactor in Isfahan. In March Washington convinced Ukraine not to provide a turbine for the Bushehr project and to end nuclear cooperation with Iran. In return, Kyiv signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States and won the Clinton administration's support for Ukraine's membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Iraq: Since its defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq has been subject to rigorous inspection and monitoring by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As required by UN Security Council Resolution 687, UNSCOM and IAEA must verify the total elimination of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, its ballistic missiles, and the means of producing them. IAEA no longer believes Iraq possess any fissile material or proscribed equipment or Production capabilities. Questions remain though about Baghdad's past enrichment research, weaponization studies, concealment plans, and post-Gulf War procurement activities. IAEA maintains an intrusive monitoring and verifications systems in Iraq's remaining nuclear-related facilities and imports.

Libya: Libya is a member in good standing of the NPT. Washington, however, maintains that Tripoli is till interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Libya's efforts to do so have repeatedly been hampered by mismanagement and the inability to acquire key technology due to a UN embargo in place since 1992. Of chief concern today are allegations of Libyan efforts to acquire fissile materials and competent weapons scientists from abroad.

Algeria: Discovered in 1991 to be building a reactor suitable for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons and a reprocessing facility, Algeria placed the reactor under IAEA safeguards. Two years later Algerians announced its intention to adhere to the NPT. In January 1995, Algeria finally acceded to the NPT.

Argentina and Brazil: In the 1980's both countries were pursuing nuclear weapons programs until elections led to both countries renouncing nuclear weapons and signing unto to the Treaty of Tlateloco, the nuclear weapons-free zone accord for Latin America. Both acceded to the NPT, Argentina in 1995 and Brazil in 1997.

South Africa: South Africa successfully developed its own indigenous nuclear weapons program using enriched uranium and then--unique among nations--gave up its arsenal of six nuclear weapons of its own volition. Dismantlement of the program was completed in 1991, and was made public in 1993. South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and in 1994 was declared to be nuclear weapons-free by the IAEA.

The Roman Catholic Church's position on the issue of proliferation can be found on this web page at Nuclear Weapons Cannot be Justified and Deserve Condemnation and One Hundred years of Catholic Social Teaching.

Sources: Arms Control Association, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Compiled by Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Created 7/11/1998