St. Joseph Church
Bristol, Connecticut

Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Pastoral Minister

Hypothesis on Nationalism and War:
A Summary

IMMEDIATE CAUSES

The greater the proportion of state-seeking nationalities that are stateless, the greater the risk of war.

The more that nationalities pursue the recovery of national diasporas, and the more they pursue annexationist strategies of recovery, the greater the risk of war.

The more hegemonistic the goals that nationalities pursue toward one another, the greater the risk of war.

The more severely nationalities oppress minorities living in their states, the greater the risk of war.

 

CAUSES OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS FOR THEIR OPERATION

Structural Factors:

Stateless nationalisms pose a greater risk of war if they have the strength to plausibly reach for freedom, and the central state has the will to resist their attempt.

The more densely nationalities are intermingled, the greater the risk of war.

The risks posed by intermingling are larger the more local (house-by-house) rather than regional (province-by-province) the pattern of intermingling.

The risks posed by intermingling are larger if the rescue of diasporas by the homelands is difficult but possible; smaller if rescue is either impossible or easy.

The greater the defensibility and legitimacy of borders, and the greater the correspondence between these political borders and communal boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.

The less secure and defensible the borders of emerging nation-states, the smaller the risk of war.

The greater the international legitimacy of the borders of emerging nation-states, the smaller the risk of war.

The more closely the boundaries of emerging nation-states follow ethnic boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.

 

Political/Environmental Factors:

The greater the past crimes committed by nationalities toward one another, the greater the risk of war.

The better these crimes are remembered by the victims, the greater the risk of war.

The more responsibility for past crimes can be attached to groups still on the scene, the greater the risk of war.

The less contrition and repentance shown by the guilty groups, the greater risk of war.

The greater the coincidence of power and victimhood, the greater the risk of war.

The more severely nationalities oppress minorities now living in their states, the greater the risk of war. (This restates Hypothesis No. 1.4; I list it twice because it operates a both a direct and a remote cause of war.

Perceptual Factors:

The more divergent are the beliefs of nationalities about their mutual history and their current conduct and character, the greater the risk of war.

The less legitimate the government of leaders of nationalist movements, the greater their propensity to purvey mythical nationalist beliefs, hence the greater the risk of war.

The more the state must demand of its citizens, the greater its propensity to purvey mythical nationalist beliefs, hence the greater risk of war.

If economic conditions deteriorate, publics become more receptive to scapegoat myths, hence such myths are more widely believed, hence war is more likely

If independent evaluative institutions are weak or incompetent, myths will more often prevail, hence war is more likely.

Reference: Theories of War and Peace, MIT Press, 2000. Please refer to Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,pp. 260-261, Dr. Steven Van Evera.

Cited by Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Created 1/30/2001