St. Joseph Church
Bristol, Connecticut

Deacon Robert M. Pallotti
Pastoral Minister

In one of the most remarkable documents of the nuclear era 60 former generals and admirals of the international community published a statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. They call our attention to the rare historical opportunity for the world to finally end the nuclear nightmare that has held the world hostage since July 16, 1945. With the end of the Cold War the rationale for the thousands of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia no longer exists. Deep cuts from thousands nuclear weapons to a few hundreds, and eventually total elimination, is possible. Failure to seize this moment in history could lead to increasing pressures on nuclear threshold states to go nuclear. The recent nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan bear testimony to growing risk of nuclear weapons spreading to a number of nations and terrorist groups.

These generals and admirals were in positions of command in the heart of the nuclear Leviathan. Their words need to be attended to by all members of the human race, and especially those of religious faith. For Roman Catholics the words of these former commanders echo the concerns of the U.S. Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace, 1983, for total nuclear disarmament. But we know that statements are not enough ! It will take organized and concerted action on the grassroots level by all members of the human family. Perhaps the best place to begin is in small groups dedicated to addressing this issue. Small groups dedicated to living out the mission of the Church can provide the opportunity for effective action in dealing with this moral-political problem. For more information contact Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, Pastoral Minister, St. Joseph Church, Bristol, Ct. at 1-860-583-1369 or E-Mail at rpallotti@snet.net

Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals

We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of the nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired and intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever--unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United Sates and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a reversible nuclear potential. However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now :

First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia should--without any reduction in their military security--carry forward the reduction process already launched by START-they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to levels of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency (cf. glossary) in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war--in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging--cannot be determined. It is clear, however , that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that nuclear powers will not agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition if the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states--China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan ( India and Pakistan are now declared nuclear weapons states by virtue of their nuclear weapons tests in May 1998); and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

The dangers of proliferation,(cf. glossary) terrorism, and new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

( To view signatories to the statement go to http://www.wagingpeace.org/jointstate.html)

U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Forces

START I was signed July 31, 1991 (cf. Arms Control Agreements on this website), and entered into force on December 5, 1994. Under the treaty, the five parties--the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine--semi-annually exchange memorandum of understanding (MOU) data providing numbers, types and locations of accountable strategic nuclear weapons. The table below compare the number of START-accountable deployed warheads declared in the initial September 1990 MOU with data from the July 1997 MOU, demonstrating the progress the parties have made in nuclear force reductions thus far.

U.S. Strategic Forces:

Warhead by Delivery System

September 1990 July 1997

ICBMs

MX 500 500

Minuteman III 1,500 1,845

Minuteman II 450 55

Total 2,458 2,400

SLBMs

Poseidon (C-3) 1,920 320

Trident I (C-4) 3,072 1,536

Trident II (D-5) 768 1,920

Total 5,760 3,776

Bombers

B-52 (ALCM) 1,968 1,620

B-52 (Non-Aclm) 290 49

B-1 95 93

B-2 0 19

Total 2,353 1,781

Total Warheads 10,563 7,957

Soviet/Russian Strategic Forces:

Warhead Delivery by System

ICBMs

SS-11 326 0

SS-13 40 0

SS-17 188 0

SS-18 3,080 1,860

SS-19 1,800 1,020

SS-24-silo 560 100

SS-24-rail 330 360

SS_25 288 360

Total 6,612 3,700

SLBMs

SS-N-6 192 16

SS-N-8 280 192

SS-N-17 12 0

SS-N-18 672 624

SS-N-20 1,200 1,200

SS-N-23 488 488

Total 2,804 2,480

Bombers

Bear (ALCM) 672 512

Bear (Non-Alcm) 63 10

Blackjack 120 48

Total 855 570

Total Warheads 10,271 6,750

Compiled by Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Created 8/14/1998