. Joseph
Church
Bristol, Connecticut
Deacon Robert M. Pallotti
Pastoral Minister
Seventy-five U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn
Policy of Nuclear Deterrence
The Morality of
Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States
Issued on the 15th
Anniversary of "Challenge of Peace, God's Promise and Our Response", June 1998.
In 1983 the U.S. Catholic
Bishops published a groundbreaking pastoral letter entitled, "The Challenge of Peace:
God's Promise and Our Response." This letter came at the most dangerous time in the
Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In this
letter the bishops called for an end to the arms race and for immediate steps to be taken
for general nuclear disarmament. The bishops called into question the fundamental policy
and reality of the nuclear age, "deterrence"--the nuclear stand off of MAD or
mutual assured destruction. The growing nuclear arsenals, combined with their increased
lethality and nuclear war-fighting capability, compelled the bishops to allow for only a
"provisional acceptance" of deterrence conditioned on good faith efforts and
realization of nuclear disarmament by the major nuclear powers.
The statement of the 75 Pax Christi Catholic Bishops of the United
States is a recognition that progress has been made in the area of nuclear disarmament.
But it also points out that much has yet to be done. We still live in a MAD world, and
will for the foreseeable future if the present framework for the START I and START II, and
even START III agreements are fully implemented. Despite the dismantlement of thousands of
nuclear warheads each side will maintain thousands of strategic warheads in reserve. It is
to this situation, and the recent alarms raised of nuclear proliferation dangers, in light
of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests in May of 1998, that the bishops have
called upon the nations to not pass up this historic opportunity to move more forcefully
away from those weapons that hold people, creation and the Lord in contempt.(1)
Despite the progress made in recent years a
number of problems remain. China is improving its long-range missiles, Iran has tested a
new medium range missile, and both major nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia still have
thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert--perpetuating a risk of nuclear war
that never had, and cannot now be justified ! (2)
The following is the text of these 75 U.S. Catholic
Bishops.
Dear Sisters and Brothers,
We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and
members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of
nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and
particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United
States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some
moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It
is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.
In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral
Letter The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, grappled with the
unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because
of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their
use would not be morally justified. We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world
in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear
weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military
objective.
Deterrence
Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in
acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a
deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable,
but
acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with the clear
steps toward progressive disarmament.
Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear
deterrence. It depended on three criteria:
a.) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy
only. As we stated then, "We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term
basis for peace."
b.) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim only
"to
prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;" and
c.) a reliance on deterrence must be used "not as an end in
itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament."
In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown
in Peace, we further specified that progressive disarmament must mean a
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a
concrete policy goal
A New Moment
In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it
was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and
maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were
considered two historical forces against each other--capitalism in the West and communism
in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each
other's ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were
accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no
longer exists. The United States is now abiding its democratic successor, the Russian
Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to
destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that
struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications
and new missions to fulfill.
But, with the end of the Cold War came a new hope. World opinion has
coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological
and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of
this opinion wee note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired
Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the
nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary,
destabilizing and must be outlawed. We also note the historic International Court of
Justice opinion of July 1996, "The threat or the use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law."
The
Court went on the say, "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control."
Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its
condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new
moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, "If biological
weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear
weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear.
Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity
from such a scourge."
Unfortunately the monumental political changes that occurred in
the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the
military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It
is absolutely clear to us that the present U.S. policy does not include a decisive
commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons
policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond
their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a
commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations
that do not possess nuclear weapons. "Flexible targeting strategies"
are
aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either
preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons to other threats to U.S.
national interests. This expanded role of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent is unacceptable !
A New Arms Race
In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a
continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an
expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with
the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program,
a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for
the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next
century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear
weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the
event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which will ban full-scale underground
nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is
currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment
in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop and test ! and maintain nuclear
weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear
weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities)
shows no intention of moving forward with "progressive disarmament" and
certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.
Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the
institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on
nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this
point clear. The Directive indicates that the United
States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation's
strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring
Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as
well as other undefined vital U.S. interests abroad. Does not this
policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come
? The Department of Energy's own timetable for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop,
test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the
interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983.
In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the
growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats:
"The
United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should
unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and
should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons." Nuclear
deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to
these goals.
Inherent Dangers
The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included he intention to
use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent
has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and
so-called rogue nations. The inherent instability in
a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us
to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That
danger can become manifest if but one so-called rogue nation calls the deterrent
bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of
nuclear weapons. This must be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons
should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in
opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Moral Considerations
Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral
acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear
deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but
rather has become the very "long-term basis for peace" that we rejected
in 1983.
b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold
War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The
role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a
global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of
vital national interests abroad.
c) although the United States and the republics that made up the
former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous
stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position
of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the U.S. intends to retain its nuclear
deterrent into the indefinite future.
Gospel Call of Love
As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us
to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not
only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those
who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We
speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where
these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived
of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to
the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the word
of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, "by their cost
alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve." We speak out of love for both
victims and the executioners, believing that "the whole law is fulfilled in one
statement, namely, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself ."
It is out of love that we raise up our voices with those around the
world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon
the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to
the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his
position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to
the United Nations stated in October 1997 (cf. "Nuclear Weapons Can Not be Justified and Deserve Condemnation"
and "Excerpts From Nuclear Crash" on this web page).
"The work that this committee (1st
Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear
weapons convention must be increased. those nuclear weapons states resisting such
negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear
deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion
of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie
ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather
than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. "Nuclear
weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be
justified.
They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation
Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. "This is a moral
challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be
met by the application of our humanity."
We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are
painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear
weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not.
Instead they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other
nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be
used by someone.
Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe
they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the
community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II's waning that "violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts
between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence."
On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the
time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third
Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the
constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear
deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the
excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these
horrendous weapons.
We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort
to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.
May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
(To view signatories: http://www.wagingpeace.org/news/paxchristi.html
)
Footnotes
(1) SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press,
1997), pp.342-393. Study on Deterrence:Its Implications for Disarmament and the Arms
Race, Negotiated Arms Reductions and International Security and Other Relate Matters,
(New
York, United Nations Publications, 1987). Arms Control Today,
(Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association,
October 1997), pp.3-21. Robert C. Aldrige, Nuclear Empire, (Vancouver, Canada, New
Star Publications, 1989), pp. 1-23, 54-155. Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win A
Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans, (Boston, South End Press, 1987). Paul C.
Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence,
(New
York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 3-51. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of
the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca, London,
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1-107. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz,
The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,(New York, London, Norton Books, 1995).
(2) Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental
Nuclear War, (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution , 1993),pp. 1-37. Philip E. Tetlock,
Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern and Charles Tilly, Behavior Society and
Nuclear War, Vol. I, (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989). pp. 9-59,
207-298. Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Walliman, The Coming Age of Scarcity:
Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, (Syracuse, Syracuse
University Press, 1998), pp.1-20.
Compiled by Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Created 7/24/1998
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